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EGYPT

Cairo's increasing belligerency toward the conservative Arab states is bringing Egypt to the point of confrontation with the US in the area. The cutoff of all US Government overflights of Egypt regardless of destination is the latest manifestation of Egyptian displeasure with the US.

Recent Egyptian propaganda attacks against the Jordanian regime claim to be "rocking the throne under Husayn." Cairo's continuing open support for the anti-Husayn Palestinian refugees is adding to the King's problems. The banning of US planes carrying arms to Jordan from overflying Egypt is the most recent anti-Jordanian, as well as anti-US move.

Cairo now alleges that the US and UK are behind a bloc of states hostile to Egypt. The situation is aggravated by Egypt's growing economic difficulties.

If relations deteriorate further, the Egyptians are likely to harass US officials in Egypt and instigate propaganda attacks against the Wheelus Air Base in Libya. The stopping of US Navy ships transiting the Suez Canal on grounds that they carry atomic weapons is always possible. In addition, Cairo could mastermind sabotage of Saudi and Libyan pipelines, and step up bombing of Saudi Arabia. The latter action could embarrass King Faysal and force the US to "put up or shut up" on its commitments to Saudi Arabia. Other possibilities open to Cairo are the seizure of additional privately owned US plants, such as Ford, and a further tightening of the Arab boycott against firms trading with Israel.

Moreover, if Nasir learns that the US is bypassing Egypt by overflying the Sudan--the only alternative route for arms to Jordan, he will probably bring pressure on Khartoum to ban such flights. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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2. NIGERIA

Nigeria's long drift toward fragmentation and possible civil war, only slowed by the meeting of top leaders in Ghana last month, is accelerating again. The two leading protagonists, Supreme Commander Gowon and Eastern military governor Ojukwu, have been unable or unwilling to compromise on such basic issues as governmental structure, army organization, or allocation of revenues.

Gowon, who seems unable to fathom the intensity of Eastern Ibo feeling, is under renewed pressures to take military action against the East. Should he yield to these pressures, the breakup of the federation and civil war would be ensured. His senior advisers are aware of the great difficulties involved in mounting a military operation, but there are also a number of hotheads around Gowon. Military preparations are under way in all four regions, and troops are being repositioned along both sides of the border between the Eastern and Northern regions.

Ojukwu needs more income to create employment for hundreds of thousands of refugee Ibos from other regions. He is seriously considering going after the Federal Government's share of revenues generated in the East, in which oil royalties paid directly to Lagos bulk large. To get control of these, Ojukwu would have to put pressure on the oil producers in the East. This might in itself provoke Lagos to action.

Pressure from Northern minority tribes for the creation of separate states only adds to the tensions. Gowon reportedly has already agreed to this in the North and seems determined to carve up the East as well, a move Ojukwu strongly opposes.

Any relaxation in the situation appears now to depend on getting Ojukwu and Gowon together again, but this seems less and less likely as time goes by. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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3. ARGENTINA

Tension has increased in the struggle between the Ongania government and the Argentine labor movement, and a major confrontation is increasingly likely.

Ongania has made it clear to union leaders that he does not intend to back down on revamping the railroads and on other labor reforms. He will use military force, if necessary, against union defiance. The unions, through the General Confederation of Labor, have announced an "action plan" (Plan de Lucha) calling for short strikes and demonstrations to begin on 20 February and for a general strike to occur on 1 March. The government has banned the demonstrations and has frozen the funds of key unions. It may also be considering a plan to put some of the unions under military control.

Strict security measures are in effect to protect the inter-American conferences, which are now scheduled to last through 22 February, and the regime undoubtedly hopes to avoid violence at least until the meetings are over. If a showdown does occur, it could produce a long period of tension and labor unrest.

Some labor leaders claim they cannot compromise in the face of government pressure without losing the support of their rank and file. Most armed forces leaders seem satisfied with the government's stand thus far, but Ongania probably could not make concessions to the unions now without considerably increasing military discontent. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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4. RUMANIA

Rumania seems to be seeking improved relations with the US, particularly in the economic, scientific, and cultural fields.

Party chief Ceausescu, in a rare private audience with a Western diplomat, met with US Ambassador Davis on 31 January for the first time during the ambassador's year-long residence in Bucharest.

This exchange followed Bucharest's recent decision to send 23 ranking economic and industrial officials to the US for long study visits. That decision came after a conference early in January of virtually the entire Rumanian leadership, at which foreign policy was probably reviewed.

The meeting between Ceausescu and Davis, arranged at the suggestion of a high party official, produced nothing new. The two went over known Rumanian foreign policy objectives, with emphasis on Western Europe and the US.

Bucharest may also be preparing new foreign policy initiatives designed to improve its ties with Western Europe as well as with the US. Such initiatives are probably designed to reflect Rumania's independence of action within the Soviet bloc. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD)

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